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INTRODUCTION
This Article begins by presenting the need for further investment in
infrastructure and by explaining why sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) could
help. It describes certain obstacles to realizing this goal, notably the lack of
effective, specific regulation of SWFs. It then proposes a potential solution
to this problem: host states and SWFs could enter into agreements
providing that SWFs will abide by certain obligations and that any disputes
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will be submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) for settlement by arbitration. After describing the legal
details of this proposal, this Article identifies and evaluates certain
limitations and potential problems with it.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Need for Infrastructure Development
The importance of infrastructure to economic development is almost
axiomatic. Without proper roads, bridges, water supply, electrical grids,
and telecommunication networks, people are extremely limited in creating,
obtaining, and providing goods and services. And when people cannot
effectively engage in production and commerce, economic growth will
necessarily be restricted. Developing countries around the world are
hampered by insufficient infrastructure, and solving this problem is
generally considered an essential element of any plan for sustained
economic development in these nations.1
The construction and maintenance of infrastructure requires
continuous and substantial investment. One recent study estimates that by
the year 2030, up to $67 trillion will be needed for this purpose worldwide,
with developing countries accounting for roughly half of this amount.2
That much money would be hard to procure under any economic
conditions, but the recent financial crisis has exacerbated this difficulty in
various ways. For instance, banks’ decreased lending capacity has made it
more difficult to borrow money for investment in infrastructure projects.3
In addition, governments across the globe have faced critical budget
shortfalls,4 which limits how much they can spend on their own countries’

1. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, POSITIVE INFRASTRUCTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REVITALIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/ip/ec/PositiveInfrastructure-Report.pdf; Katherine Lewis, Better Infrastructure Brings Economic Growth, IIP
DIGITAL (May 24, 2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2012/05/201205246230.
html.
2. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. & MCKINSEY INFRASTRUCTURE PRACTICE, MCKINSEY & CO.,
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTIVITY: HOW TO SAVE $1 TRILLION A YEAR 10 (2013), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Urbani
zation/Infrastructure%20productivity/MGI_Infrastructure_Full_report_Jan2013.ashx [hereinafter MGI
STUDY].
3. Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008, 97
J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2010); Christopher Harress, Bank Loans Haven’t Recovered from the Financial
Crisis and Current Lending Shows Slide Similar to Pre-recession Data, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 30,
2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/banks-loans-havent-recovered-financial-crisis-currentlending-shows-slide-similar-pre-recession-data.
4. See Cash Surplus/Deficit (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
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infrastructure.
B. The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Given these obstacles, the world’s investment requirements in the
infrastructure sector appear likely to go unmet. To avoid this outcome,
many different changes will be necessary, none of which will be sufficient
by itself. For instance, the McKinsey Global Institute considers it essential
that countries improve their productivity in the infrastructure sector to
lower the total amount of investment that is actually needed.5 But even if
these improvements are made, it will also be crucial to encourage increased
investment in this sector by those who can afford to make it.
SWFs are among the few types of investors that can still commit funds
in the amounts and timeframes that infrastructure projects require.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of an SWF, the
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (the IWG) uses a
general definition suitable for this Article’s purposes. The IWG defines
SWFs as “special purpose investment funds or arrangements” that are
established and owned by governments for macroeconomic purposes to
“hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives” and to
employ various investment strategies, including investment in foreign
financial assets.6
As of March 2014, by one estimate, SWFs globally have over US$6.6
trillion in assets under management,7 and this amount has been growing
almost exponentially in recent years.8 Compared with other types of
investors—such as private equity firms, which have to respond to many
different investors, and pension funds, which have regularly occurring
liabilities—SWFs often have less concern for liquidity and a longer-term
investment horizon, especially following the recent financial crisis.9 As a
GC.BAL.CASH.GD.ZS (last visited June 25, 2014) (showing a sharp increase in budget deficits
between 2008 and 2009 in most countries for which data is provided).
5. MGI STUDY, supra note 2, at 4.
6. INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3 (2008), available at
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES].
7. Fund Rankings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited June 25,
2014).
8. In each of the previous five years, this figure has grown by 5.6%, 11.5%, 10.9%, 16.1%, and
16.5% respectively, and in the aggregate, it has grown by over 75% since 2008. PREQIN, THE 2014
PREQIN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND REVIEW: SAMPLE PAGES 1 (2014), available at https://www.preqin.
com/docs/samples/2014_Preqin_Sovereign_Wealth_Fund_Review_Sample_Pages.pdf?rnd=1
[hereinafter PREQIN REVIEW].
9. Id. at 2; Gerard Lyons, A Growing Role for Sovereign Wealth Funds, MCKINSEY ON
SOCIETY, http://voices.mckinseyonsociety.com/sovereign-wealth-funds/ (last visited June 25, 2014).
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result, assets such as infrastructure that provide “low risk and stable
returns” are often particularly attractive to SWFs.10
SWFs have historically invested most of their funds in relatively
liquid assets, such as public equities and fixed income.11 Although these
assets continue to constitute the majority of collective SWF assets, in
recent years SWFs have been directing an increasing share of their funds
toward “alternative” assets, notably infrastructure, which draws
investments from over half of the world’s SWFs.12 In addition, compared
with other types of investors, SWFs are more likely to invest directly in
infrastructure than in passive assets such as unlisted funds.13 This shift has
occurred in part because volatility in equity markets and low fixed-income
yields in the wake of the recent financial crisis have reduced the appeal of
these asset classes.14 Another advantage is that the timeframes of
infrastructure projects tend to match these SWFs’ long-term investment
horizons.15 In addition, although SWF allocations remain concentrated in
developed countries, these funds have increasingly directed resources
toward developing ones.16
These trends are obviously positive for those concerned with the
expected shortfall in infrastructure investment, particularly in the
developing world, where domestic funds are much less available. But
given the formidable size of the remaining gap, it is necessary to encourage
even further investment.
II. CHALLENGES TO OVERCOME
A. Concerns About Sovereign Wealth Funds
Although SWFs have displayed an increasing enthusiasm for investing
in infrastructure, foreign host states sometimes object to such
transactions.17 In these cases, host states have expressed, or are suspected

10. Lyons, supra note 9.
11. PREQIN REVIEW, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Paul Bishop, Sovereign Wealth Funds Investing In Infrastructure—July 2013, PREQIN (July 2,
2013), https://www.preqin.com/blog/101/6921/sovereign-fund-infrastructure.
14. INVESCO, INVESCO GLOBAL SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT STUDY 2013, at 14
(2013), available at http://igsams.invesco.com/downloads/IGSAMS_en.pdf [hereinafter INVESCO
STUDY].
15. Lyons, supra note 9.
16. INVESCO STUDY, supra note 14, at 21.
17. Mark A. Clodfelter & Francesca M.S. Guerrero, National Security and Foreign Government
Ownership Restrictions on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at the National Level, in
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 173, 174–75 (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds.,
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to have had, concerns that SWFs are motivated not just by financial returns
but by political considerations, “such as accessing military technology,
controlling strategic resources or markets, or influencing public opinion.”18
Host states may also worry “that countries operating SWFs wish to
accumulate assets through deliberate low currency rates, thus distorting
comparative competitive advantages.”19 Many commentators believe that
these concerns are not justified,20 but whether they are is irrelevant to this
Article. After all, as long as potential host states fear these ulterior
motives, rightly or wrongly, they will be less likely to allow SWFs to invest
within their borders. Therefore, these concerns are worth addressing for
anyone seeking to promote such investment.
In addition, in some host states, if a legal dispute eventually arises
from the proposed investment, SWFs could potentially claim sovereign
immunity from litigation due to their status as state instrumentalities.21
Even though such a claim may not succeed in some states’ courts due to the
commercial nature of the SWFs’ relevant activities (or for other reasons),
the mere possibility of such a claim may be enough to discourage some
host states from allowing SWF investment in their domestic infrastructure.
It is impossible to determine with any precision just how often host
states limit or restrict investment by SWFs. Although official processes
that expressly block particular transactions due to foreign sovereigns’
involvement may make news headlines,22 these cases may represent only a
portion of inhibited economic activity because it is impossible to know just
how much discussion and negotiation between host states and SWFs is
avoided, how many invitations for investment are not sent to SWFs, or how
many SWF bids for projects are rejected by host states.
It is clear, however, that further investment in infrastructure is needed,

2012).
18. Id.
19. Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller, Nationalism or Capitalism? Sovereign Wealth Funds of Non-OECD
Countries, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 202, 203 (Xu Yi-chong &
Gawdat Bahgat eds., 2010).
20. See, e.g., Rolando Avendaño & Javier Santiso, Are Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments
Politically Biased? A Comparison with Mutual Funds, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND
POLICY REACTIONS, supra note 17, at 221 (finding that SWFs’ investment practices do not suggest
political motives); Ørstrøm Møller, supra note 19, at 222 (concluding that EU and OECD countries
have “little evidence” to support their fears that SWFs pose a threat).
21. See FABIO BASSAN, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 89–115 (2011) (exploring
whether and how “SWFs can invoke state immunity, protecting their action or challenging the
enforcement of host state measures”).
22. The Dubai Ports World controversy in the United States is a notable example. See Bill Gertz,
Security Fears About Infiltration by Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A01, available at http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/feb/22/20060222-122115-8912r/?page=all.
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that SWFs represent one of the best sources to meet this need, and that, as a
result, further encouragement of SWF investment in infrastructure is
advisable. To accomplish this goal, it is necessary to alleviate potential
host state concerns about SWF intentions, transparency, and governance.
B. Existing Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds
To address such concerns, in 2008 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) convened the IWG, which consisted of 26 IMF member countries
with SWFs, including most of the world’s largest SWFs.23 Following
several meetings throughout the year, this group adopted a set of Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices known as the “Santiago Principles.”24
The IWG sought to comfort potential host states and other investment
partners by codifying principles with the following “guiding objectives”:
i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of
capital and investment;
ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements
in the countries in which they invest;
iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and returnrelated considerations; and
iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that
provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and
accountability.25

The Santiago Principles themselves consist of 24 discrete principles
that provide somewhat more specific directives regarding one or more of
the four objectives listed above.26 A few of the principles contain two or
more “subprinciples” that elaborate on the main principles to which they
correspond.27 For instance, the first of these principles appears as follows:
GAPP 1. Principle
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its
effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).
GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should
ensure legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.
GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7–9.
Id.
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structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other
state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.28

Despite the best efforts of the IWG, the Santiago Principles face some
inherent limitations on their ability to encourage host states to permit and
promote investments by SWFs.29 First, the principles were designed to be
loose in nature, in part so that each endorsing state could implement them
in the manner that best fits its particular circumstances.30 Even if the literal
fulfillment of every principle sufficed to accomplish the IWG’s objectives,
in reality many host states might want to see more specific, substantial, and
numerous commitments from SWFs or the states to which they belong.
Second, to the extent that the Santiago Principles do provide for clear
undertakings by SWFs, they do not in any way constitute binding or
enforceable obligations. This is, once again, by design: the IWG expressly
calls these rules “a voluntary set of principles and practices that the
members of the IWG support and either have implemented or aspire to
implement.”31 Hence, a mere aspiration to implement the rules is all that is
required for endorsement. For a host state that is genuinely concerned
about an SWF’s intentions or governance, the SWF’s simple endorsement
of the Santiago Principles is unlikely to provide much comfort absent
additional actions, disclosures, or undertakings by the SWF.
Even if the Santiago Principles were somehow made binding on
SWFs, their practical enforceability would still be questionable. In this
scenario, host states and SWFs might designate a forum in which the
former could bring claims that the latter have breached their obligations. If
they were to choose the national courts of the host state, or if they were to
remain silent on the issue and those courts were the default forum under
applicable law, then further concerns could arise.
For instance, under certain circumstances, SWFs might be able to
claim that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the national
courts’ jurisdiction. In addition, while making this claim, the SWF might
benefit from various procedural protections or advantages. For instance, in
the United States, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA),32

28. Id. at 7.
29. For a more detailed assessment of the Santiago Principles, see EDWIN M. TRUMAN,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? 121–39 (2010).
30. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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pre-judgment attachment of property is excluded unless immunity from
such attachment has been specifically waived and there is a showing that
the attachment is to secure satisfaction of later judgment, not to obtain
jurisdiction. In addition, if a civil action is brought in state court against
a SWF, the defendant may remove it to the federal district court in that
district, where any trial will be before a judge without a jury. The SWF
has a presumption of immunity under the FSIA, which the plaintiff has
the burden of rebutting by showing that the action falls into one of the
statute’s exceptions. If the plaintiff fails to make such a showing, then
the SWF will be afforded immunity, unless, of course, it has otherwise
waived immunity.33

In many cases, if the SWF were found to be acting in a commercial
capacity, thereby fitting into an exception to the host state’s doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the national courts might have jurisdiction after all.34
But there does not appear to be any established case law regarding the
application of these doctrines to SWFs, and in some situations, SWFs have
indeed benefitted from sovereign immunity.35 Furthermore, as described
above, the mere potential relevance of sovereign immunity to any particular
investment dispute might exhaust time and resources as the parties debate
its applicability. For all of these reasons, in countries in which a sovereign
immunity doctrine might apply, national courts might prove both unreliable
and inefficient for resolving disputes that arise from SWF investments.
The choice of national courts as a forum could also negatively distort
behavior through moral hazard if an SWF were to ignore the host state’s
laws on the assumption that it would be protected by sovereign immunity.
Indeed, this might be a legitimate fear of a potential host state and might
reduce the likelihood that the state would permit the SWF’s investment in
the first place. By contrast, if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were to
not apply to an SWF’s actions and if the host state’s national courts were to
have jurisdiction over an investment-related dispute, then the SWFs might
fear that those courts would unfairly favor the state because of its “home
court advantage.” This too could limit investment by SWFs.
Accordingly, the Santiago Principles, as the primary form of
regulation that is specific to SWFs, are too vague to provide enough

33. Clare O’Brien, Tania Mattei, & Naveen Thomas, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving
Perceptions and Strategies, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., Dec. 24, 2012, at 6 (citation omitted), available
at
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/01/Sovereign-WealthFunds-Evolving-Perceptions-and-__/Files/View-full-article-Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-Evolvin__/File
Attachment/SovereignWealthFundsEvolvingPerceptionsandStrate__.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012);
BASSAN, supra note 21, at 93–96 (discussing immunity in other jurisdictions).
35. BASSAN, supra note 21, at 104–06.
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guidance to SWFs or to alleviate the concerns of potential host states.
Their non-binding nature and unenforceability also limit the comfort that
host states can reasonably take in these principles. This Article proposes a
different approach to regulation that is intended to address all of these
issues with the ultimate goal of promoting investment and thereby
development.
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION
To overcome the challenges described in the previous section,
effective regulation of SWF investments must provide for binding and
enforceable obligations that are clear enough both to provide direction to
SWFs and to reassure host states that SWFs will not cause harm. To these
ends, this Article proposes a form of regulation through individual and
enforceable contracts. Host states that are concerned about SWFs’
intentions, governance, or other characteristics should make agreements
with the SWFs (or the investor states to which they belong) in advance of
their investments. Such an agreement should provide that, in exchange for
the SWF’s right to invest in the host state, the SWF shall abide by the
Santiago Principles and comply with any more specific obligations that the
host state reasonably requires. These provisions would ensure that the
SWF’s obligations are binding and as clear as necessary to reassure the
host state that the investment can safely proceed.
To make the obligations not only clear and binding but also effectively
enforceable, the parties should consent to submit any dispute arising out of
or relating to the agreement (which would of course include any claim that
the SWF has breached any of its obligations) to ICSID for settlement by
arbitration. In addition, each party should waive any rights of sovereign
immunity that might apply to the execution of any awards that may be
rendered against that party.36 As opposed to litigation in the host state’s
national courts, these provisions would ensure that no such rights would
preclude jurisdiction over a dispute or execution of an award (reassuring
the host state) and that the host state will not have an unfair “home court
advantage” in its national courts (reassuring the SWF).
A. Substantive Obligations in the Agreement
As described above, one of the main limitations of the Santiago
Principles as a form of regulation is their non-binding nature. An express

36. See, e.g., ICSID Model Clauses: VII. Waiver of Immunity from Execution of the Award, INT’L
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/modelclauses-en/15.htm (last visited June 25, 2014).
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written agreement between the host state and the SWF could overcome this
limitation by imposing a binding obligation on the SWF to abide by those
principles.
Another limitation of the Santiago Principles is their vague nature and
potentially insufficient scope. For instance, one principle that may
particularly interest host states is the third:
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely
coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to
ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.37

Depending on the nature of the investment and the relationship between the
parties, the host state may wish to provide more precise requirements for
coordination of the SWF’s activities with domestic authorities. These
requirements might, for instance, specify certain activities from which the
SWF should refrain, reserve the host state’s right to preapprove certain
other activities, or impose specific reporting obligations on the SWF. To
effect these goals, the agreement between the host state and the SWF could
impose additional obligations on the SWF or place conditions (e.g., the
prior written consent of an agency of the host state) on certain specified
actions by the SWF.
These steps could make the SWF’s obligations binding, more specific,
and better-tailored to the nature of a particular investment. To have real
value, however, the proposed arrangement must also have an effective and
reliable enforcement mechanism. This is where ICSID comes into play.
B. International Arbitration in the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes
1. Background
The World Bank established ICSID in 1965 through the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (the ICSID Convention).38 Since then, 150 states (Contracting
States) have ratified the ICSID Convention and have remained contracting
parties.39 ICSID “provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of

37. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 7.
38. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Introduction to ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES 5 (2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basic
doc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
39. Member States, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.
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investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other
Contracting States,”40 with the aim of removing “major impediments to the
free international flows of private investment posed by non-commercial
risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment
dispute settlement.”41 It is generally considered “the leading international
arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement.”42
To date, ICSID has concluded 285 cases, nearly all of which arose
from investors bringing actions against host states due to a breach by the
latter of obligations contained in a bilateral investment treaty or another
agreement.43 This is characteristic of the broader international investment
regime, which was assembled largely to protect foreign investors from
wealthy countries against regulatory abuses by poorer host states.44 But
investments by SWFs may invert this supposed power dynamic, with host
states fearing abuses by sovereign investors. This scenario calls for a
different approach to regulation.
The one-sided nature of ICSID’s history does not mean that it is
suitable only for disputes brought by investors: nowhere do the ICSID
Convention or ICSID’s other rules and regulations limit its facilities to
cases of this nature.45 The overarching goal of ICSID is to promote
international investment. So far it has done so by reassuring investors that
they will have a viable avenue for recourse if the host state mistreats them,
but now there is an opportunity for ICSID to also encourage investment by
offering host states a reliable forum in which to bring actions against
abusive investors, as elaborated below.
2. Jurisdictional Requirements
For ICSID’s jurisdiction to extend to a dispute, the following
requirements must be met: (1) the disputing parties must have consented in
writing to the submission of their dispute to ICSID arbitration or

org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates_H
ome (last visited June 25, 2014).
40. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 38, at 5.
41. About ICSID, INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Ho
me (last visited June 25, 2014).
42. Id.
43. List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded
(last
visited June 25, 2014).
44. José E. Alvarez, Sovereign Concerns and the International Investment Regime, in SOVEREIGN
INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS, supra note 17, at 258, 259–61.
45. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 38.
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conciliation, (2) the dispute must be between a Contracting State and a
national of another Contracting State, and (3) the dispute must qualify as a
“legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.”46 Fortunately, all of
these requirements could be satisfied by disputes brought by host states
against SWFs for breach of the SWFs’ contractual obligations.
First, the requirement of consent would be easily satisfied in the
situation under discussion. The Report of the Executive Directors on the
Convention explains that “[c]onsent may be given, for example, in a clause
included in an investment agreement, providing for the submission to
[ICSID] of future disputes arising out of that agreement, or in a compromis
regarding a dispute which has already arisen.”47 Therefore, an agreement
containing such a dispute resolution provision made between a host state
and an SWF would constitute consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction.
As for the second requirement, with 150 Contracting States as of this
writing, ICSID’s membership would cover the vast majority of the
potential pairs of host states and states with active SWFs.48 A “national” of
a Contracting State includes “any juridical person which had the nationality
of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date
on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration” (i.e., the date of the agreement including the dispute resolution
clause).49 SWFs are typically juridical persons with the nationality of the
states to which they belong, so they would generally qualify as “nationals”
for the determination of ICSID’s jurisdiction.50

46. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), in ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 38.
47. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Report of the Executive Directors of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States ¶ 24, in ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 38.
48. Of the 60 SWFs with the most assets under management, only three do not belong to
Contracting States. See Fund Rankings, supra note 7; see also INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPS., LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION (2013),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ShowDocument&language=English (last visited June 25, 2014).
49. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 25(2)(b).
50. An SWF in such a dispute might object to ICSID’s jurisdiction on the grounds that it is not a
“national” but instead a “State party” due to its status as a state-owned entity, but respondents who have
contested jurisdiction on these grounds in the past have failed. See, e.g., Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 16–17 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 251 (1999) (stating that “the accepted test for”
determining “whether a company qualifies as a national of another Contracting State within the
meaning of Article 25(1) . . . . has been formulated as follows: . . . for purposes of the Convention a
mixed economy company or government-owned corporation should not be disqualified as a national of
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The third jurisdictional requirement turns on the definitions of “legal
dispute” and “investment.” To qualify as a “legal dispute,” “[t]he dispute
must concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal
obligation.”51 This criterion would be satisfied by a host state’s claim that
an SWF had breached its obligations under a legally binding agreement.
As for the term “investment,” the framers of the ICSID Convention made
“no attempt . . . to define” it and instead deferred to the parties to “make
known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they
would or would not consider submitting to” ICSID.52 Therefore, to ensure
that disputes arising from an SWF’s investment can be brought in ICSID,
the agreement between the host state and the SWF should define
“investment” broadly to include all contemplated activities expected to
arise from the transaction, and the parties should amend this definition
upon any expansion of those activities beyond its previous scope.53
Therefore, as long as the host state and the state to which the SWF
belongs are both Contracting States, parties seeking to submit any
investment disputes to ICSID could straightforwardly fulfill the

another Contracting State unless it is acting as an agent for the government or is discharging an
essentially governmental function” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 161–62 (2d ed. 2009) (summarizing
several cases that “confirm that claimants may have significant State ownership interests, but still
qualify as a ‘national of another Contracting State’ for the purposes of Art. 25(1)”).
51. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 47, ¶ 26.
52. Id. ¶ 27.
53. Note, however, that parties do not have unlimited freedom in defining what constitutes an
investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 48–53 (Aug. 6, 2004), 19 ICSID Rev.
486 (2004) (“[T]here is a limit to the freedom with which the parties may define an investment if they
wish to engage the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals.”). ICSID tribunals may examine sua sponte whether
the objective requirements of jurisdiction have been satisfied. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 41. In this manner, some tribunals have considered whether the alleged
investment (i) has a certain duration, (ii) involves a certain regularity of profit, (iii) involves a certain
level of risk and commitment, and (iv) is significant for the host state’s development. See SCHREUER
ET AL., supra note 50, at 128–34 (setting forth these criteria and examining how various tribunals have
applied them “to determine whether the activities under dispute constitute an investment”). The
infrastructure projects that are the subject of this Article would likely meet any such test, as ICSID
tribunals in the past have found a wide range of infrastructure projects to have done so. See, e.g.,
M.C.I. Power Grp. L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award (July 31, 2007),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0500.pdf (construction of
electricity plants); L.E.S.I. S.p.A. v. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/05/3,
Decision
on
Jurisdiction
(July
12,
2006),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC528_Fr&caseId=C48 (construction of a dam); Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004) (civil
construction contract).
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institution’s jurisdictional requirements by including appropriate provisions
in the same written agreement that sets forth the SWF’s obligations. This
is most of what is required to ensure that a reliable dispute resolution
mechanism will be available, but to ensure that any award rendered by an
arbitral tribunal will also be enforceable, some additional measures are
advisable.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State, whether or
not it is a party to the dispute, to recognize any award as binding and to
enforce the award’s pecuniary obligations (i.e., obligations to pay money)
as if the award were a final judgment of the state’s domestic courts.54
Therefore, when an award is rendered, the prevailing party can enforce it in
any Contracting State. This ability can be useful when the losing party
does not voluntarily pay on the award and has assets located in a
Contracting State. In this situation, the prevailing party can seek to execute
the award against those assets in compliance with the state’s applicable
legal procedures.
But if the assets that the prevailing party seeks to execute belong to a
state or state instrumentality such as an SWF, then the court may decline to
order the execution because the assets are protected by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.55 Indeed, the framers of the ICSID Convention
expressly contemplated this possibility, noting that “[t]he doctrine of
sovereign immunity may prevent the forced execution in a State of
judgments obtained against foreign States or against the State in which
execution is sought.”56 To make this clear, the ICSID Convention provides
that nothing in the provision requiring Contracting States to recognize and
execute awards should “be construed as derogating from the law in force in
any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign
State from execution.”57 In fact, such a situation played out when a
company controlled by French nationals, after winning an ICSID award
against Liberia, sought to execute the award against assets of Liberia
located within the United States.58 The U.S. federal courts ultimately
denied these requests, largely because the assets were protected by

54. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 54.
55. See BASSAN, supra note 21, at 93–96 (providing an overview of SWFs and their immunity
from jurisdiction).
56. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 47, ¶ 43.
57. Id.
58. See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).

THOMAS MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REGULATING SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS THROUGH CONTRACT

6/26/2014 10:12 PM

473

sovereign immunity under the FSIA.59
In the case of an agreement between an SWF and a host state, such an
outcome could be prevented if each party were to expressly “waive[] any
right of sovereign immunity as to it and its property in respect of the
enforcement and execution of any award rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal
constituted pursuant to [the] agreement.”60 In most investments not
involving SWFs, only the host state would be protected by sovereign
immunity, so only the host state would ever make such a waiver. But when
the investor and its property might also be protected, as in the case of an
SWF, it makes sense for the waiver to be bilateral.61 In this situation, when
a host state seeks to execute an ICSID award against an SWF’s assets in a
Contracting State, the SWF could not claim that those assets are protected
by sovereign immunity.
If properly implemented, these measures should ensure that host states
and SWFs will have recourse to a reliable and effective dispute resolution
mechanism, resulting in legally enforceable awards.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Diversion of Investment
Some may be concerned that the approach proposed in this Article
could discourage investment by SWFs in host states that insist that the
SWFs make binding and enforceable obligations with respect to their
activities. SWFs deterred by host states that make these requests might
choose instead to invest in less demanding host states, to make only passive
59. See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610
(D.D.C. 1987) (“The Court, however, declines to order that if any portion of a bank account is used for
a commercial activity then the entire account loses its [sovereign] immunity.”).
60. ICSID Model Clauses: VII. Waiver of Immunity from Execution of the Award, supra note 36.
61. Of course, this waiver would be useful to the host state only if the SWF signing the agreement
has assets that are both located in Contracting States and substantial enough to satisfy payment of a
potential award. This may not be the case, for instance, if the SWF is newly constituted solely for the
investment corresponding to the agreement. In such a situation, the host state should seek to have the
state to which the SWF belongs cosign the agreement, guarantee the obligations of the SWF under both
the agreement and any arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the
agreement, and waive its rights of sovereign immunity as described above. One limitation of this
approach is that the state’s guarantees would not be enforceable through ICSID arbitration: they would
be made by one state to another, and ICSID disputes must be between a state on one hand and a national
of a different state on the other hand. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46,
art. 25(1). Therefore, the agreement would have to designate a separate forum, most likely the host
state’s national courts, with respect to those provisions, and this may not be useful if the guarantor state
does not have substantial assets within the host state. Fortunately, SWFs by their nature typically do
have substantial assets in Contracting States around the world, so the situation presented in this
paragraph should arise only very rarely, if ever, and state guarantees should not typically be needed.
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rather than direct investments in infrastructure (e.g., investing in an unlisted
funds or purchasing a non-controlling stake in a local entity), or to divert
funds to an asset class other than infrastructure. Eventually, such a trend
could discourage states from adopting this Article’s proposed approach or
could even reduce the total amount of investment by SWFs in
infrastructure.
The justifiability of this fear depends ultimately on the amount of
leverage that each party has in the negotiation, which is difficult to
generalize across different transactions. If a host state were to have a great
deal of leverage prior to the commencement of an investment because, for
instance, the state offered uniquely lucrative opportunities, then one would
expect the SWF to be more likely to agree to certain obligations than it
would be when dealing with a host state that presents essentially fungible
opportunities.
As a result, it would be wise for host states to assess the degree of
leverage that they possess in any negotiation with an SWF and to insist on
an agreement of the sort proposed by this Article only when that degree is
relatively high. In addition, the host state would be justified in requesting
such an agreement whenever it has particularly serious concerns about the
SWF’s intentions, governance, or other characteristics. If a request in that
situation causes the SWF to balk, then it might indicate the SWF’s
unwillingness to cooperate more generally, and its withdrawal might be in
the host state’s best interests. In this way, a request that the SWF accept
reasonable obligations could allow the host state to test the SWF’s level of
commitment to a fair and mutually beneficial relationship.
Therefore, although this concern might limit the utility of the proposed
approach in some situations, it could still be implemented to host states’
benefit when they most need reassurance and security.
B. Limitations of ICSID
Another potential inadequacy of the proposed approach arises from
the limitations of ICSID. Because ICSID cases have almost all been
brought by investors against host states, arbitrators who normally serve on
ICSID tribunals, including those on the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, may
not have the experience needed to determine all of the issues that may arise
in the contractual disputes envisaged by this Article. They may know a
great deal about expropriation of investors’ assets by host states but know
little of, for instance, how to calculate the damage to host states resulting
from malfeasance by investors. Similarly, they may have expertise in
interpreting bilateral investment treaties but difficulty with the kinds of
private contractual arrangements proposed in this Article. As a result, the
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parties may need to appoint arbitrators with more relevant experience, even
if they have not served in many ICSID cases.62 Eventually, the Contracting
States may wish to choose new arbitrators to serve on the Panel.
Although ICSID’s limitations may impede the adoption of the
proposed approach at first, in the long term it should not prevent these
arbitrations from taking place successfully. Any novel process requires
certain changes, and initial inexperience with SWFs should pose no more
difficulty for ICSID than did the Centre’s initial establishment. Indeed, the
institutional framework is already present and sufficient for the arbitrations
contemplated by this Article, with no significant organizational or legal
changes necessary. Accordingly, the process of identifying new arbitrators,
while potentially tedious, should not bar the development of a promising
new way to encourage investment, which is, after all, ICSID’s ultimate
goal.
C. Resource Limitations
ICSID arbitrations can be costly, and some developing countries may
not have the resources necessary to pursue claims against SWFs who have
breached their contractual obligations. It would be easy to overstate this
problem, however, because many developing countries have already
participated in ICSID arbitrations to completion.63 To the extent that
excessive costs pose an issue, one potential solution would be for the
agreement between the parties to require the SWF to pay the host state’s
expenses in connection with an arbitration in which the host state prevails.
The feasibility of including such a requirement in the agreement
would depend, once again, on each party’s leverage in the negotiation. As
a result, when (1) a host state expects that it will not be able to afford
arbitration expenses, (2) an SWF refuses to agree to cover these expenses,
and (3) the host state is particularly concerned that the SWF will breach its
obligations, the host state should consider not allowing the investment. But
again, if the host state’s concern is legitimate, then avoiding this investment
might be in the state’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
These practical considerations are important to keep in mind, but
rather than invalidating the approach proposed by this Article, they refine

62. Parties in an ICSID arbitration may select arbitrators from outside of the ICSID Panel of
Arbitrators. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 40(1).
63. Note the prevalence of developing countries among the parties in the list of concluded cases
at ICSID. See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 43.
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its scope and present important yet surmountable obstacles to its complete
implementation. Overall, the regulation of SWFs through contractual
obligations that are enforceable through international arbitration would
constitute an improvement on today’s non-binding, imprecise, insufficient,
and unenforceable forms of self-regulation. If potential host states that
would otherwise reject investments by SWFs chose instead to allow them
to proceed with contractual protections in place, then these states would
eventually attract more money for crucial development purposes such as
infrastructure, as their economies so urgently need.

